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Abstract  
The present paper tests the widely accepted hypothesis that 
on-line judgment implies functional independence between 
memory for, and judgment of, verbal stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 
1989; Hastie & Park, 1986). In the present study, participants 
recalled lists of words, after having assessed each for its 
pleasantness. Presentation position of a negative item within 
the lists was manipulated. Also, items memorability was 
manipulated after their presentation – by inserting a filled 
delay between presentation and the judgment task; in this 
way, on-line judgment formation was spared. The memory 
manipulation reduced recall rates for negative items presented 
in the last position – and their negative influence on 
pleasantness ratings accordingly. These results contradict the 
predictions of pure on-line approaches to judgment formation 
(e.g., Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001) and 
suggest that even in on-line judgment tasks, memory plays a 
role. 
 
Keywords: on-line judgment, memory, accessibility, 
retrospective evaluations, delay effects.  
 
Introduction  
In everyday life, it is a regular experience to evaluate events 
once they have unfolded. Retrospective evaluations 
(hereafter RE) can be defined as the summary assessments 
of the quality of the event, provided in hindsight; RE are 
coherent evaluations which involve the integration of 
information from hedonic states into a unitary judgment. 
Such evaluations can be provided about episodes which may 
have varied in quality and intensity over time (Fredrickson, 
2000) and about target stimuli which have been presented in 
a sequential manner (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Bruine 
de Bruin, 2005).  
A very important question concerns the nature of the 
memory processes involved in RE: Do people retrieve 
episodic information about experiences in order to evaluate 
them in hindsight?  In the literature, there are two 
contrasting approaches to this question that are more widely 
documented. On one hand, some theoretical accounts (e.g. 
the two-memory hypothesis; Anderson, 1989; Anderson & 
Hubert, 1963; the value-account; Betsch et al., 2001) 
propose functional autonomy between memory and 
judgment processes. According to these accounts, 
impressions of episodes are formed “on-line” (i.e., while 
they are being experienced) and RE are based on the 
product of this on-line judgment. Retrieving episodic 
information from the event itself is viewed as a cognitively 
costly operation –which is called upon if, and only if, the 
on-line judgment is prevented (for example, by not 
forewarning participants about the subsequent judgment 
task; Hastie & Park, 1986). These approaches propose that 
people do not rely in any significant manner on episodic 
information about an event when they evaluate it in 
hindsight. 
On the other hand, several theoretical views suggest that –
to some degree or another– retrieved information influences 
judgment often leading to biases in RE (e.g., Dougherty, 
Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; see 
also Schwarz, 1998). For these approaches, the moments 
within an episode that are most available in memory (i.e. 
“accessible”; Schwarz, 1998) disproportionately affect RE. 
In support of the role of retrieval in summary assessments, 
many studies have found significant correlations between 
memory and judgment measures, suggesting that memory 
and judgment may be functionally related (e.g., Aldrovandi, 
Poirier, Heussen, & Ayton 2009; Reyes, Thompson & 
Bower, 1980; Schwarz, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
However, experimental evidence that highlights 
correlations between memory and judgment does not 
preclude the possibility that such correlations are 
attributable to other factors (e.g., vividness; Shedler & 
Manis, 1986). It remains possible then that retrospective 
judgment is not causally related to retrieval processes. For 
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instance, Anderson (1989) suggested that impression 
memory (i.e., on-line judgment) and verbal memory (i.e., 
episodic memory) may be “distinct functionally” (p. 209) 
but the output from the two systems may correlate since 
they operate on the same attended stimuli. To re-iterate, the 
suggestions is that even if 'memory for' and 'judgment of' 
verbal stimuli are significantly related this does not 
necessarily imply that people base their retrospective 
judgments on the episodic information they retrieve from 
memory. 
The aim of the present investigation was to implement a 
stricter test of the hypothesis that people access information 
about a specific event in order to evaluate it. Stronger 
evidence in support of the role of memory in RE would be 
produced if manipulating the memorability of certain 
moments within the to-be-assessed episodes influences 
retrospective judgment. If RE do not depend on the 
information retrieved from memory, then manipulating the 
accessibility of some segments within the events should not 
affect judgment in hindsight. On the other hand, if retrieval 
and judgment processes are functionally dependent, then the 
easier it is to access specific information, the larger its 
impact on RE. 
Some studies have attempted to predict judgment as a 
consequence of experimental memory manipulations (e.g., 
Gabrielcick & Fazio, 1984; Hanita, Gavanski, & Fazio, 
1997; Lewandowsky & Smith, 1983). Lewandowsky and 
Smith (1983) increased the memorability of non-famous 
instances within a set through repetition, which in turn 
increased the corresponding frequency estimates 
participants provided. The authors concluded that the 
successful memory manipulation affected the participants’ 
judgment responses (see also Gabrielcick & Fazio, 1984). 
One of the common features of most of these studies is that 
the experimental manipulation was implemented prior or 
during the presentation of the—to-be-judged and to-be-
recalled—stimuli; it seems thus reasonable to argue that 
such manipulation may have affected on-line judgment 
formation as well—most likely in the same way as it 
influenced memory. Hence, manipulating memorability of 
the information after its presentation may provide more 
convincing evidence that people access the episode trace of 
the stimuli in order to assess them—instead of retrieving 
whatever evaluation was performed on-line, while attending 
to the stimuli.  
Furthermore, participants in the above cited studies (e.g., 
Lewandowsky & Smith, 1983) were asked to complete an 
evaluation task that involved frequency estimation of 
specific instances within a search set—a typical example of 
frequency judgment (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In 
the literature, there is less evidence that bears upon the role 
of memory in hedonic or quality judgments, which in all 
likelihood do not rely on the same cognitive processes as 
frequency estimation (see Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992 for a 
discussion of this issue). 
Aldrovandi et al. (2009) showed that inserting a negative 
item within a list of neutral words significantly reduced the 
judged pleasantness of the list – relative to lists that did not 
contain a negative item. More specifically, both primacy 
and recency effects were observed for RE, as lists with a 
negative item presented either in the first or last positions 
were rated more unpleasantly than those lists where the 
negative item was presented in the middle positions. In the 
present paper, we called upon the same type of stimuli and 
judgment task—but influenced memorability of the negative 
items through an additional manipulation. For some lists, a 
filled delay was inserted after the items presentation; the 
effects of filled delay manipulations are well established in 
the literature, and when implemented in such simple 
fashion, they lead to a decrease in recency effects (e.g., 
Bjork & Whitten, 1974).  
The rationale was that if a negative item’s accessibility in 
memory is lowered –as it is presented at the end of a list and 
a filled delay follows items presentation– then its impact on 
the summary assessment of the list as a whole should be 
smaller than if the negative item’s accessibility is not 
manipulated (no delay or immediate condition). As items’ 
accessibility in memory was manipulated after stimuli 
encoding –and more importantly after the on-line judgment 
evaluation was formed– no delay effects should be observed 
for judgment if RE are solely based on on-line processing. 
Study 
In this study, the role of memory in RE was investigated. 
First, memorability of the information was manipulated 
after the items presentation; hence, it seems reasonable to 
argue that on-line judgment formation was relatively 
unaffected by the experimental manipulation. If RE are 
purely formed on-line—at least when people are aware of 
the subsequent judgment task, like in the present case—then 
there should be no significant effect of a post-hoc 
manipulation: After all, the on-line judgment is formed 
while the stimuli are attended to – and this on-line 
impression is what RE are based upon. On the other hand, if 
memory biases judgments –at least in part–, then it is 
expected that whatever effect is going to be seen for the 
memory results it is going to be reflected in the judgment 
pattern. 
Second, we examined the associations between memory 
and judgment. RE were elicited first and memory for the 
content of the word-list obtained second (details of how this 
was done follow below). Hence, it was possible to contrast 
the mean pleasantness rating obtained when the negative 
item was recalled with the mean rating for the trials when it 
was not recalled. Presumably, if a distinctive item is 
available for later recall, it is more likely to have been 
available at the time of judgment. Conversely, if the 
negative item is not available for recall, the probability that 
it was available at the time of judgment is reduced. Hence, 
we would expect that on average, the pleasantness rating 
will be lower in the cases where the negative item was 
available for the memory component of the task. The effect 
of a negative item’s availability was further analysed by 
examining ease of recall. As a measure of relative memory 
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accessibility, we used output position in the memory task. 
Since participants were asked to perform free recall (hence 
no output constraints were implemented), we made the 
simplifying assumption that items recalled first are on 
average more readily accessible in memory. It was assumed 
that negative items recalled early on were more easily 
accessible and would have had more impact on RE than 
negative items that are recalled later on. Hence, our 
hypothesis was that the earlier a negative item was recalled, 
the stronger its impact on retrospective evaluations.  
Method 
Participants A total of 79 participants (49 males) took 
part in the internet-based experiment, advertised through 
ipoints®. Participants’ age ranged from 28 to 65 years (M = 
46.9, SD = 10.2) and they were granted ipoints® in 
exchange for their participation.  
 
Design and Materials A pool of 132 words was selected 
from the Affective Norms of English Words database 
(ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). Sixteen negative items 
were selected along with 116 neutral ones. The selection 
was based on the valence and arousal scores of each item on 
the database scales. Negative items were selected to be low 
in valence (less than 3, on a scale of 1-9) and high in arousal 
(over 5.9, on the same scale). Neutral items scored in the 
middle range for valence (5.3 to 6.2) and low on the arousal 
scale (less than 4.6).  
From the resulting word pool, 22 six-word lists were 
created, as follows. Six lists included a negative item in the 
first position followed by 5 neutral words—hereafter 
identified as “Start” lists. Four “Middle” lists had a negative 
item in the middle positions (2 lists in 3rd position and 2 lists 
in 4th position.)1 Six “End” lists comprised five neutral items 
and a negative word in last position. Finally, six control lists 
contained only neutral words. 
Within-list matching between the negative (if any) and the 
neutral items ensured that negative and neutral words were 
equated on familiarity ratings (Coltheart, 1981; M = 531.9 
and M = 530.8, respectively), number of phonemes (M = 4.7 
and M = 4.4, respectively), and the Kucera-Francis 
frequency index (Kucera & Francis, 1967; M = 28.2 and M 
= 34.8, respectively). Furthermore, lists were pair-matched 
on the above dimensions; rotation across participants 
allowed each list to be presented approximately the same 
number of times as each of the different list types and in 
each different delay condition. 
 
Procedure A series of introductory screens gathered 
demographic data and allowed participants to familiarise 
themselves with the computer-controlled procedure and to 
accept the conditions described in the consent form. 
Participants were told that the aim of the study was to gather 
                                                 
1
 Analyses revealed no major differences in either memory or 
judgment measures between lists with a negative item in 3rd or 4th 
position.  
normative data about the pleasantness of 6-word lists. They 
were instructed to attend to the lists and to provide an 
overall pleasantness rating for each one after its 
presentation. The ratings were on a 0-100 scale (0 = very 
unpleasant, 100 = very pleasant), and participants were 
encouraged to make use of the whole range in their 
responses.  
Each word was presented for one second with an inter-
stimulus interval of 0.75 seconds. A series of asterisks 
appeared on the screen for 1 second to signal the end of the 
list presentation. After the asterisks had disappeared from 
the screen, in half of the trials participants were prompted to 
immediately provide their rating (immediate condition). 
Participants were required to use the mouse to click on a 
slide bar (with extremes of 0 and 100) on the position they 
felt was closest to their impression of the list. In order to 
limit the extent of anchoring effects (e.g., Chapman & 
Johnson, 2002) a sliding marker would appear on the bar 
(with its equivalent numerical value underneath) only after 
participants clicked for the first time on the slide bar. 
Participants then had the opportunity to adjust this initial 
rating by sliding the marker, and were to confirm their final 
one by clicking on a “Continue” button. In the remaining 
half of the trials, participants had to engage in a distractor 
task that lasted 10 seconds (delay condition). During this 
task, a letter was presented on the screen, and participants 
had to type the following letters, skipping one letter between 
each entry; for example, if the letter ‘A’ was presented, 
participants had to type in the letters ‘C’, ‘E’, ‘G’, and so 
forth. After the distractor task, participants provided the 
judgment task. Delay condition was manipulated within-ss, 
and the alternation between delay and immediate trials was 
randomised for each participant.  
After rating a given list’s overall pleasantness, 
participants were required to perform a recall task, during 
which they had to recall the two items that came to mind 
most readily –and any further item they may remembered in 
the following screen. This modified version of a free recall 
task was used to reduce the cognitive demands of the 
memory task. Previous research has shown that typical 
recall tasks, which require participants to perform an 
exhaustive search in memory, can hinder the underlying 
associations between memory and judgment (e.g., Kitayama 
& Burnstein, 1989). This finding is in line with many others 
which suggest that people seem to base their evaluations on 
partial information – on the elements they can retrieve and 
that are most easily accessible in memory (e.g., Schwarz, 
1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In addition, participants 
were asked not to overlook the rating task in order to 
proceed more quickly to the recall task. Four practice trials 
were provided. List presentation order was randomised 
independently for each participant and no time limit was set 
for either the rating or the recall tasks.  
Results  
Information about the IP address and the time participants 
took to complete the whole experiment was collected. One 
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participant was excluded from the analysis because of 
excessive task duration, as it took her 112 minutes to 
complete the whole experiment (while the average duration 
was 24 minutes.) Six more participants were excluded 
because of their poor performance on the distractor task, 
which ranged from 0% to 4% correct trials. This resulted in 
the total sample size being 72 (i.e. overall, 8.9% of 
participants were excluded.) Alpha was set to .05 for all 
analyses.  
 
Memory Figure 1 represents the mean recall proportion for 
the negative items as a function of item position and delay 
condition. The recall pattern for the negative items was 
different between the two delay condition—and in the line 
with the predictions2. Both primacy and recency effects can 
be observed in the immediate condition; however, recency 
effects disappeared when a filled delay was inserted 
between items presentation and the recall task.  
 
Figure 1: Mean proportion recall for negative items as a 
function of word position and delay condition. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The data were analysed using a 3 (position: 1st, 3rd/4th, and 
6th) × 2 (delay: immediate vs. delay) repeated measure 
ANOVA. Main effects of position (F(2, 127.6) = 28.8, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .29)3 and delay (F(1, 71) = 10.1, p = .002, ηp2 = 
.12) were noted.  Most importantly, the position by delay 
                                                 
2
 Preliminary analyses revealed that, overall, recall for negative 
items (M = .58, SD = .16) was higher than for neutral words (M = 
.48, SD = .15; t(71) = 6.4, p < .001, d = .76). 
3
 When degrees of freedom are not integers, they were adjusted 
according to the Greenhouse-Geisser correction due to violations 
of the Sphericity assumption. 
interaction was significant, F(2, 142) = 3.5, p = .033, ηp2 = 
.05. Post-hoc analyses with Bonferroni adjustment revealed 
no recall differences between immediate and delay 
conditions for negative items presented at the beginning or 
in the middle of the list (ps > .79). For recency positions 
there was a recall advantage for the immediate condition, 
t(71) = 4.3, p < .001, d = .51. 
 
Judgment In order to reduce the influence of potential 
anchoring effects (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002) and of 
inter-individual differences in the use of the 0-100 scale, 
judgment scores were transformed as follows: For each 
participant, the average pleasantness rating for the Control 
lists was subtracted from the pleasantness ratings for each 
Start, Middle and End list. The new corrected judgment 
scores (J’) therefore represented how much more unpleasant 
each Start, Middle and End list was in comparison to the 
average Control list for each participant. J’ scores were then 
averaged for each participant, according to the negative item 
presentation position and whether the negative item 
presented in the list was recalled or not.  
The judgment pattern mirrors the memory results. There 
seems to be little or no difference for pleasantness ratings 
for Start and Middle lists; however, End lists were rated as 
more unpleasant in the immediate condition compared to the 
delay condition.  
 
Figure 2: Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list type 
and delay condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
A 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA was run, with list 
type (Start, Middle and End) and delay (immediate vs. 
delay) as the factors. The significant main effects of list type 
(F(2, 127.1) = 3.3,  p = .047, ηp2 = .04) and delay (F(1, 71) = 
7.7,  p = .007, ηp2 = .09) were qualified by the significant 
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interaction between the two variables (F(2, 142) = 7.4,  p < 
.001, ηp2 = .10). Post-hoc analyses with Bonferroni 
adjustment confirmed that there was no reliable difference 
in terms of pleasantness ratings between immediate and 
delay conditions for Start and Middle lists (both ps > .19); 
on the other hand, End lists were rated as significantly more  
pleasant in the delay condition, t(71) = 4.1, p < .001, d  = 
.49. 
 
Memory-Judgment relationships4 We explored the 
associations between memory and judgment in two ways. 
First, we compared the corrected average pleasantness 
rating for lists where the negative item was recalled versus 
lists where the negative item was not recalled (cf. 
availability as “content of recall”; Schwarz, 1998)—
separately for the immediate and delay conditions. Table 1 
indicates that when the negative item was recalled in the 
memory task, pleasantness ratings were lower (M = -11.7, 
SD = 9.6) than when the negative item was not recalled (M 
= -5.9, SD = 7.0). This pattern seems true for both 
immediate and delay conditions.  
A 2 (memory: negative item recalled vs. not recalled) × 2 
(delay: immediate vs. delay) within-subjects ANOVA 
confirmed these observations. The main effect of memory 
was significant (F(1, 71) = 40.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .37), 
confirming that overall ratings were more unpleasant for 
those lists where the negative word was recalled. Neither the 
main effect of delay (F(1, 71) = 2.5, p = .113) nor the 
interaction between memory and delay (F < 1) were 
significant – the latter confirming that the memory and 
judgment measures were associated regardless of the delay 
condition. 
 
Table 1: Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J’) as a 
function of list type and negative item being recalled or not 
 
  Delay condition 
 
  Immediate  Delay 
Was the negative 
item recalled? 
 
    
No M -7.1  -4.7 
 SD (10.2)  (7.2) 
 
Yes M -12.2  -11.2 
 SD (10.3)  (10.9) 
 
 
Second, retrospective evaluations were analysed depending 
on the negative item recall position5,6. The pleasantness 
                                                 
4
 For all these analyses, non parametric tests were run as well—as 
parametric assumptions were not always met. As all the results 
were the same, we will report the parametric analyses.  
5
 This analysis yielded a total of 3.2% missing values, which were 
missing completely at random as the MCR Little’s test was not 
significant, χ2 (2) = 1.5,  p > .47. Missing values were replaced 
using different methods, including mean substitution by subject, 
grand mean, and Expectation-Maximization algorithm (Schafer & 
Olsen, 1998). As all the analyses returned the same results, we will 
ratings (J’) were examined according to the position in 
which the negative item was recalled by the participants – 
regardless of its presentation position. The underlying 
rationale was that items that are more accessible in memory 
are likely to be recalled earlier—if the negative item is more 
accessible and recalled early we would expect its impact on 
retrospective evaluations to be higher than when it is 
recalled later in the protocol or not at all (cf. availability as 
“ease of access”; Schwarz, 1998) 
 
Table 2: Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J’) as a 
function of negative item recall output position  
 
     Negative item recall output position 
 
  Not 
recalled 
Positions 
1 & 2 
Positions  
3 to 6 
 
 
Pleasantness 
ratings (J’) M -6.6 -13.3 -8.3 
 SD (6.9) (10.7) (11.1) 
 
 
Table 2 above suggests that pleasantness ratings varied 
depending on the negative item output position – and that 
they were lowest when the participants recalled the negative 
item as either the first or second response (M = -13.3, SD = 
10.7).  
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of recall 
position on pleasantness ratings (F(2, 142) = 18.5, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .21). Post-hoc analyses with Bonferroni adjustment 
confirmed that judgments provided when the negative item 
was recalled among the first two responses were lower than 
when it was recalled among the last four responses (t(71) = 
6.4, p < .001, d = .77) – or not recalled at all  (t(71) = 3.9, p 
< .001, d = .46). For the latter two scenarios, the difference 
was not significant, t(71) = 1.5, p = .383.  
Discussion  
The results of the present experiment suggest that, even 
when aware of the upcoming judgment task, people rely on 
the memory trace in order to provide RE (see also 
Dougherty et al., 1999; Schwarz, 1998).  
As expected, inserting a filled delay hindered recency 
effects for the items’ recall. More importantly though, 
negative items presented at the end of the series exerted a 
large impact on RE for the immediate condition—while 
recency effects for RE were largely hampered in the delay 
condition. 
The results of the correlational analyses support the 
prediction that, even in on-line judgment tasks, memory 
drives RE. Pleasantness ratings were lower for the lists 
where the negative item was recalled—compared to those 
where it was not recalled. This finding supports the idea that 
                                                                                  
be reporting the data obtained via Expectation-Maximization 
algorithm.   
6
 In this case, the analyses could not be broken down by delay 
condition because of the large number of missing values. 
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when negative information was easily available in memory 
at the time of judgment, it exerted a higher impact on 
judgment. The assumption was that when a negative item 
was not recalled in the memory task, it was also less likely 
to be available at the time of RE; on average, this would 
lead to a less negative assessment of the list. These results 
suggest that, when prompted to provide a pleasantness 
rating, participants relied at least to some extent on episodic 
information stored in memory. If participants had solely 
relied on on-line judgment formation, there would be no 
reason to expect the observed judgment pattern for the delay 
condition; after all, the on-line judgment stores the formed 
impression which will be the base for the RE. Furthermore, 
accessibility in memory of a negative item seemed to 
moderate retrospective judgment, since lower ratings were 
associated with the negative item being recalled early in the 
response sequence. The on-line view would not lead to the 
expectation that the accessibility of the distinctive-negative 
item would have an impact on RE. 
In conclusion, the results of the present experiment 
provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that memory 
plays a significant role in biasing summary assessments. 
Retrospective judgment was successfully predicted on the 
basis of the memory pattern observed. 
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